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~ 800. INTRODUCTION 
This article discusses how interest has been and is being used in tax 
planning. The tax planning techniques using interest include charging too 
little interest or none at all, reclassifying interest as principal and allocating 
interest among time periods to optimize the tax consequences to the parties. 
The issues raised by these tax planning techniques go to the heart of the tax 
system. They suggest inadequacies in the development of the case law and in 
conventional tax thinking. The unifying principal is the divergence between the 
possible tax consequences and the clear economic consequences of each of the 
transactions. The overriding policy question is whether the tax system can deal 
adequately with issues involving the "time value of money." 
The article discusses tax planning techniques through a series of propositions 
and a few hypothetical illustrating application of those propositions and 
raising questions about them. The article begins, however, with a review of 
some economic and tax fundamentals which provide the groundwork for the 
analysis. 
~ 810. Definition and Nature oflnterest 
Interest has been defined as the amount charged for the use or forebear-ance 
of money. 1 The rate of interest generally mirrors the rate of inflation. During 
times of high inflation, the prevailing rate of interest tends to be high, 
generally a few points above the rate of inflation. The real or economic rate of 
interest is the excess of the stated or nominal rate of interest over the rate of 
inflation. The tax law, however, has not drawn any distinction between the 
real and nominal rates of interest. Thus, the nominal rate of interest has been 
and continues to be the focus of tax analysis and planning. 
In general, when a loan is made and an agreement is entered into for 
repayment on a fixed schedule, the total amount of interest payable over the 
term of the loan is computed by subtracting from the total amount of 
payments to be made, the amount originally borrowed. The rate of interest, 
however, is an annual concept. It is a means of comparing loans and is a 
reflection of the yield on investment. It is determined by looking to the 
amount of money paid out and the timing of the payments, and is computed on 
the assumption that interest is earned at a uniform rate throughout the term of 
a loan." 
That uniform rate, sometimes referred to as "the yield to maturity" or 
"the effective rate of interest", when applied to the "unpaid balance" of the 
loan for any year, will result in interest attributable to that year. The unpaid 
1 Deputy v. Dupont, 308 U.S. 488. 498 (1940); Old Colony Railroad Co. v. 
Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 560 (1932). 
2 See Conf. Rep. No. 97-760, 97th Gong., 2d Sess. 553 (1982), 1982-39 I.R.B. 4, 41; 
S. Rep. No. 97-494 (Vol. 1 ), 97th Gong., 2d Sess. 209 (1982); Supplement I to 
Regulation Z issued by the Federal Reserve System, 12 CFR Sections 226.5 and 
226.40 (1979). 
130 
Interest Elements in Tax Planning 
balance of a loan is the amount borrowed plus interest earned minus 
amounts paid. Thus, the effective rate of interest is a measure of the cost of 
credit, expressed as a yearly rate. 
Labelling of payments as interest or principal will not change the 
economic substance. The amount of interest and the effective rate of interest 
are economic concepts and are determinable without regard to the labels, 
mtercst or principal, put on the payments. Labels do have consequences, 
however, for both nontax and tax purposes. 
,-r 820. Tax Characteristics oflnterest 
From an economic point of view, as discussed above, the rate of interest is 
simply a way of keeping score and a common denominator for comparing 
transactions. Labels, however, have great significance for tax purposes. 
Interest is includible as ordinary income, 3 unless specifically excluded,4 
whereas principal payments received by a lender are regarded as return of 
capital. 5 Likewise, interest expense is deductible (regardless of whether it is 
incurred in a profit-seeking endeavor or is purely personal)6 whereas principal 
payments are not. 
In addition, interest income and expense are includible or deductible, as the 
case may be, in accordance with the taxpayer's method of accounting. 7 The 
cash method taxpayer realizes interest income when the interest is actually 
or constructively received, regardless of when it is earned. 8 An accrual 
method lender, however, may realize interest income even though no actual 
payments have been received.9 
Similarly, the cash method taxpayer deducts interest only when paid and 
only in the amount representing the current or past cost of the use of the 
money. 10 An accrual method debtor, however, has been permitted to accme 
interest deductions even though he has not actually paid the interest. 11 
What has made interest unique are three basic characteristics, set forth 
below as propositions. All of these propositions have at least some supporting 
authority. 
(1) The tax law as a general rule has either ignored the time value of 
money or has dealt with it inadequately; 
(2) The parties to a loan agreement can determine how interest on the 
loan is to be earned; and, 
(3) The parties to a loan arrangement have been free to allocate payments 
between interest and principal even if the interest has not yet been earned. 
3 I.R.C. § 61(a)(4). 
4 See I.R.C. § 103, which provides an exclusion for interest on State, municipal and 
certain other governmental obligations. 
5 I.R.C. § 61 taxes only income, not return of capital. 
6 I.R.C. § 163. 
7 See I.R.C. §§446. 451 and 461. 
8 Reg.§ 1.451-l(a). 
9 1d. 
10 Reg.§ 1.461-1; I.R.C. §461(a) and (g). 
11 Reg.§ 1.461-1. 
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By studying these tax characteristics of interest income and expense as 
analyzed by some courts, the Internal Revenue Service, and in some 
instances, Congress, and contrasting them with the economic characteristics 
of interest, tax practitioners have been able to take advantage of the 
divergence in abusive manners. A number of tax planning devices have been 
created arount this divergence. I wil1 analyze and discuss each of the three 
propositions and set forth tax planning techniques that have been suggested to 
take advantage ofthem. 
~ 830. Propositions 
~ 831. The tax law as a general rule has either 
!gnored the time value of money or dealt with it 
Inadequately. 
~ 831.1. Increasing Basis 
An application of this proposition for tax planning involves using interest to 
magnify the cost of property by purchasing through a low-interest loan. The 
cost of property is used for determining its basis for depreciation purposes, 
and when applicable, for computing investment tax credit. 
When a taxpayer purchases property for cash, his basis in the property is the 
amount of cash paid. 12 Thus, a taxpayer who purchases property worth 
$100,000 for $100,000 obtains a basis in that property of $100,000 whether he 
pays his own cash or borrows the $100,000 purchase price from a bank and 
uses the property as security for the loan. 
Likewise, the result would be the same if the taxpayer instead, in effect, 
borrows the $100,000 from the seller by giving the seller a purchase money 
mortgage in the amount of $100,000, bearing interest at the market rate for 
comparable loans. Suppose, however, the taxpayer arranges his purchase 
money mortgage to pay the same total amount (interest plus principal) but 
specifies a high principal amount with a below market interest rate? 
~ 831.1(1) Section 483. 
In general, section 483 applies to deferred payment sales in which some or 
all of the payments are due more than a year after the date of the sale. When 
applicable, because the contract has not provided for interest on the deferred 
payments, or has provided for inadequate interest, the section, in effect, 
converts a portion of each deferred payment to which it applies to interest. In 
that sense, it "imputes" interest to the transaction. Historically, the taxpayer's 
characterization generally was respected prior to the enactment of section 48 
3 13 F I h . C . - B 14 . d . or examp e, t e court 111 ommzsszoner v. rown, perm1tte a contract 
12 I.R.C. § 1012. 
13 For legislative history of section 483, enacted under Revenue Act of 1964, Pub.L.No. 
88-272, 78 Stat. 19 (1964), see House Committee on Ways and Means, Revenue Act 
of 1964, H.R. Rep. No. 749, 88th Gong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. Code Gong. 
& Ad. News 1313, 1380, 1509, and Senate Committee on Finance, Revenue Act of 
1964, S.Rep.No. 830, 88th Gong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. Code Gong. & Ad. 
News 1673, 1774. See also Elliott Paint & Varnish Co. v. Comm'r, 44 B.TA 241, 247 
(1941), and Anderson & Co. v. Comm'r, 6 B.TA 713, 717 (1927), where the courts 
held that interest will not be imputed merely where the deferred payment sales price is 
greater than the cash sales price. Compare Estate of Berry v. Comm'r, 43 T.C. 723 
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of sale to omit provision for interest. Similarly, the court in Kingsford Co. 
v. Commissioner, 15 held that the entire purchase price in a deferred payment 
sale was principal, not interest, and any excess of the sum of the defened 
payments over what a cash purchase price would have been was not necessarily 
interest. 
Section 483 will not be applicable as long as the deferred payment note 
bears interest at least at the safe harbor rate of 9% per annum simple 
interest. 16 If the note bears no stated interest, interest will be imputed under 
section 483 at the rate of 10% per annum compounded semiannually. 17The 
principal amount of the note can then be determined by subtracting the 
imputed interest from the face of the note, and, presumably, will be the 
purchaser's basis in the property. 18 
,-r 831.1(2). Tax Planning Technique 
With this background in mind, one can envision a plan whose objective is to 
combine general basis mles with section 483 to magnifY the apparent cost and, 
therefore, the basis of purchased property. When property is purchased for a 
promise of future payment, either contractual or a note, bearing interest of 
at least 9% simple, the cost of the property under the general princip.les 
discussed above would be measured by the principal amount of the note. 9 If 
the purchase money note bears a less than market interest rate but nevertheless 
fits within the safe harbor of section 483, however, the face of the note may be 
substantially greater than what the cash purchase price would have been. 
In general, the value of a promissory note is a function of the principal 
amount of the note, the term of the note, the interest rate of the note 
relative to the prevailing market interest rate and the credit worthiness of 
the borrower. By placing a below market interest rate on a note, an issuer 
can issue a note with a principal amount in excess of the value of the note. In 
the absence of any requirement to charge a market rate of interest, issuers 
could have great flexibility to choose among ranges of rates and principal 
amounts. When a note is given in a purchase of property, therefore, 
purchasers could affect their basis in the property and, therefore, depreciation 
and interest deductions by adjusting the terms of the purchase money note. 
A variation on the original example will illustrate how the high basis 
objective might be achieved. Suppose the taxpayer purchases the property 
worth $100,000 with a long-term note worth $100,000. Assume the note, 
however, does not bear interest at the market rate but instead contains the 
following terms. It has a face amount of $809,727, bears interest at the 
(1965), afTd per curiam, 327 F.2d 476 (6th Cir. 1967), cert, denied, 389 U.S. 834 
(1967), reh. denied, 389 U.S. 998 (1967) (where the court imputed interest where, 
although the sales contract provided that the note was to be without interest, the 
contract contained a prepayment discount schedule which closely paralleled the 
interest which would have accrued under the buyer's earlier offer which contained a 
provision for interest payments.). 
14 37 T.C. 461, 488 (1961), afTd, 325 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1963), afTd, 380 U.S. 563 
(1965). The issue in the text was discussed in the Tax Court's opinion only, and not in 
the opinion of the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. 
15 41 T.C. 646 (1964). · 
16 Reg.§ 1.483-1(d)(1)(ii)(C). 
17 Reg. § 1.483-1 (c)(2)(ii)(C). 
18 Rev. Rul. 82-224, 1982-2 C.B. 5. 
19 Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1 (1947). 
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annual rate of 9% simple (when the market rate of interest is 12 percent 
compounded annually), and is payable in full, both interest and principal, in 30 
years. 20 The purchaser who structures his purchase in this manner expects 
to increase his basis for depreciation purposes from $100,000 to $809,727. 
Depreciation for the first year under ACRS, if the property were real property 
and were depreciated using straight line depreciation, would be $53,982 instead 
of £6,667. 
The trade-off for the purchaser's high basis is that all of the payments of the 
purchase price (the principal of the note) will be nondeductible principal rather 
than deductible interest. Any such trade-off would be generally advantageous, 
however, as long as the extra depreciation deductions in the early years 
exceeded the amount of the "lost" interest. As a result of the Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 ("ERT A"), depreciation of "recovery property" 
(tangible property used in a trade or business or held for the production of 
income (section 168(c)), is now computed under the accelerated cost recovery 
system (ARCS) without regard to the actual economic useful life of the 
property.21 Thus, the period of depreciation for most types of property has been 
shortened, making it more likely that the term of the loan could be longer 
than the ACRS useful life of the purchased property. This phenomenon is 
particularly true with regard to real property, which is depreciable under ACRS 
over 15 years. 
The potential benefits of this aspect of interest tax planning are even more 
dramatic if the investment tax credit is available on the purchase, as could be 
the case in the purchase of personal property. Assume, in the foregoing example, 
that the purchased property is 5 year ACRS property (personal property) for 
which an investment tax credit is available. In that example the investment 
tax credit would be approximately $81,000, because it is computed on the 
purchase price of the property. Moreover, the increase in depreciation 
deductions would be even more dramatic than in the previous example, even 
though, as a result of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibil!ty Act of 1982 
(TEFRA), basis in property for which an investment tax credit is taken is 
reduced by one-half of the amount of the credit. 22 Thus, the purchaser's basis 
in the second example would be approximately $769,000. Depreciation 
deductions in the first two years would nevertheless be increased to $115,350 
and $169,180 respectively, from $15,000 and $22,000. 
2
° For purposes of this example, we will assume that the note, including both 
interest and principal, is a recourse obligation of the purchaser. If it were 
nonrecourse, there is a substantial question whether the purchase money note 
would be considered an actual liability of the purchaser and therefore be includible 
in the purchaser's basis. See Estate of Franklin v. Comm'r, 544 F .2d 1045 (9th Cir., 
1976). Resolution of that question would seem to depend upon whether the 
purchaser is likely to pay off the note and that, in turn, would seem to depend upon 
the expected value in 30 years of the property securing the note. 
However, even a nonrecourse liability of $100,000 that accrued interest at 12 
percent per year compounded annually, would raise these same questions if 
payment of the entire amount of principal and accrued interest were deferred until 
the note matured. 
21 f.R.C. § 168. · 
22 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, Title II, 
§205(a)(l), 1982 U.S. Code Gong. & Ad. News (96 Stat.) 324, 427 (codified at 
I.R.C. § 48(q)). 
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The trade-off for these ta'< benefits would be reduced interest deductions for 
payments on the note. But, in both examples, payment comes at the end of the 
term of the note. 
In the examples above if the purchaser is on the cash basis, he would get 
no deduction until he paid the interest. Thus, a high face amount on the 
note permits current depreciation deductions without any loss of current tax 
benefits. 
Even a taxpayer on the accrual basis can benefit from the plan under the 
balloon note in the examples. That taxpayer must compare his extra 
depreciation deductions and their acceleration with his lesser interest deductions. 
Thus, if the purchased property is real estate, which is 15 year property, and 
the loan has a term of 30 years, the tax benefits from depreciation will outweigh 
the loss of tax benefits from interest deductions. If the property is personal 
property, the extra investment tax credit provides additional incentive for 
choosing a high face amount. Accordingly, the lnvestment Tax Credit and 
depreciation under ACRS, which comes generally faster than the duration of 
the purchase money mortgage, now make it particularly advantageous to 
understate interest. 
Interestingly, the seller of a capital asset in these transactions would 
convert interest, which would be taxed as ordinary income, to deferred 
payments of the sale price, which would be treated as received on the sale or 
exchange of property and therefore could be eligible for capital gain 
treatment. Under the installment sales rules of section 453, gain would be 
deferred until receipt of the installment payments. Thus, the plan would be 
attractive for the seller as well as the purchaser. 
,-r 831.1(3). Safe Harbor's Deficiencies. 
The technique that is involved in this variation is a play on the 9% 
simple interest safe harbor test rate of section 483. The section leaves 
unaffected a deferred payment purchase that provides for an annual interest of 
at least 9% per annum simple. The safe harbor rule leaves open these abuses 
because it deals inadequately with the problem on two accounts. First, 
during times ofhigh inflation and therefore high market interest rates, 9% may 
be substantially below the prevailing interest rate. Thus, the purchase of 
property for a purchase money mortgage bearing 9% interest may result in a 
stated purchase price and face amount of the note substantially in excess of 
the fair market value of the property or note. 
Second, even during times when 9% represents an approximation of the 
market rate of interest, the fact that the safe harbor is available for simple 
interest rather than compound interest creates great potential for abuse. 
Under a provision for simple interest, the lender earns no additional interest on 
earned but unpaid interest. For that reason, simple interest is nonsensical from a 
commercial point of view. Where all current interest payments are made 
currently, however, there is no difference between 9% simple and 9% compound 
interest. In situations in which current payments are not required, however, 
9% simple interest payable at the end of the loan results in an effective rate of 
interest of substantially less. For example, on a 30-year loan providing for 9% 
simple interest with all interest and principal payable in year 30, the effective 
rate of compound interest is approximately 5-Vz%. Accordingly, the cost of the 
property and the resultant ACRS depreciation and investment tax credit 
appear to be substantially in excess of those warranted by the fair market 
value of the property and purchaser's payment obligation. 
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While the example used here of a balloon payment of interest and 
principal may seem extreme, it does present a dramatic illustration of the 
problem with the section 483 test rate. More everyday situations involving at 
least some payments of interest differ from that case only in degree and not in 
kind.23 
~ 831.1(4). Contrary Arguments. 
There are contrary arguments to the effectiveness of this tax plan. First, a 
large discrepancy between the face amount of the purchaser's promissory 
note and the value of the purchased property, as measured by the value of the 
note or the property itself, provides a strong indication that the true cash 
purchase price was negotiated first, and the terms of the note with that value 
were then computed. In that event, even under pre section 483 case law, an 
unstated interest element computed without regard to section 483 could be 
determined by taking the "true" principal of the note as the purchase 
price. 24 Arguably, though, section 483 may preempt this analysis by providing 
certainty that meeting the 9 percent simple interest test rate is enough to 
establish both interest and principal as stated. On the other hand, the argument 
is one of substance over form. It takes the view that the interest rate s.tated 
in the agreement is not the actual agreement of the parties. Can a substance 
over form argument ever be preempted? It is a doctrine that is an override to 
the entire Code. 25 Perhaps, though, the Treasury has, in effect, conceded the 
argument. The Treasury has the power to change its regulations and if it 
chooses not to do so, perhaps it should be, and perhaps indeed is, stuck with the 
consequences. 
Second, perhaps the accounting for the purchase in this manner and the 
resulting periodic depreciation deductions constitutes a method of accounting. 
If so, the Commissioner may have discretion to change that method under 
section 446(b) if it does not clearly reflect income. Clear reflection of income, 
for these purposes, could look to generally accepted accounting principles 
as the standard. Accordingly, simple interest (as under the current Regulations) 
would be acceptable if all earned interest were paid currently or if the 
payment obligation was relatively short term. When interest payments are 
deferred, however, clear reflection could require a denial of a portion of the 
deduction for any interest not paid currently. 
The use of section 483 in this manner could be referred to as "everyman's 
tax shelter." Does it work? Many tax lawyers believe it does. 
~ 831.2. Face Amount Accruals. 
~ 831.2(1). General Principles of Accrual Accounting. 
23 For example, if a portion of the interest was payable currently and a portion was 
allowed to accrue unpaid, the effective rate of interest would be greater than 5-'/fc 
p,ercent, but still less than 9 percent. 
4 See, e.g .. Estate of Starr v. Comra'r, 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959); Estate of 
Berry v. Comm'r, 43 T.C. ·723 (1965), afTd per curiam, 372 F.2d 476 (6th Cir. 
1967), cert, denied. 389 U.S. 834 (1967). reh. denied, 389 U.S. 998 (1967). 
25 See I.R.C. § 368 and numerous cases decided thereunder such as Gregory v-
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Comm'rv. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331(1945). 
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In general, under the accrual method of accounting, income is realized 
when the right to receive payment accrues (becomes fixed and determina-ble), 
and deductions are allowed when the obligation to make payment accrues. 
The time of payment or receipt for an accrual method taxpayer is irrelevant, 
except for certain advance payments required to be included in income.26 
The Treasury Regulations under Section 461 set forth a test for determining 
when an expense is deductible for an accrual method taxpayer-the "all events 
test. "27 Under the "all events test," an expense of an accrual method taxpayer is 
deductible in the taxable year in which: 
(a) "all the events have occurred which determine the fact of liability;" 
and 
(b) the amount of the liability "can be determined with reasonable 
accuracy." 
Even if the all events test is satisfied, an expense may not be deductible or may 
be deductible only in part. Regulations§ 1.461-1 (a)(2) also provides: "However, 
any expenditure which results in the creation of an asset having a useful life 
which extends substantially beyond the close of the taxable year may not be 
deductible, or may be deductible only in part, for the taxable year in which 
incurred." 28 Thus, deductibility of an item depends upon notions of 
capitalization as well as the fixed and determinable nature of the payment 
obligation. 
If the literal requirements of deductibility are met, there is still a question of 
whether a deduction for all or a portion of the face amount of the liability 
can nevertheless be disallowed. Regulations § 1.461-1( a)(2) has generally 
been read by courts and commentators to allow a deduction for the full 
amount of the liability, although some courts have sought to disallow the 
deduction under certain circumstances and some commentators have su~gested 
that the deduction should be for less than the face amount of the liability. 9 
A series of examples will be helpful to illustrate the justification for the 
latter possibilities. The three examples suggest the potential tax advantage to 
be gained through use of money otherwise paid as taxes. The objective of 
the tax plans suggested by the examples is to obtain a current deduction for 
the amount of the liability that will not have to be paid until the future. 
~ 831.2(2). Tax Planning Technique. 
Example 1. Assume a taxpayer, T, hires lawyer, S, to perfonn services in 
connection with the taxpayer's business. The services pertain to, and are 
performed in, the current year. T pays S 510,000, which T has borrowed 
from a bank, payable in 5 years by repayment of principal plus $10,000 
26 See, e.g., Schlude v. Comm'r, 372 U.S. 123, 136-137 (1963); American Auto. 
Ass'n v. United Slates, 367 U.S. 687,692 {1961), rch. denied, 368 U.S. 870 (1961); 
Auto Club of Michigan v. Comm'r, 353 U.S. 180, 189 (1957), reh. denied. 353 U.S. 
989 (1957); RCA Corporation v. United States, 664 F.2d 881 (2nd Cir. 1981), cert, 
denied, 102 S.Ct. 2958 (1982) (requiring immediate realization of income from 
services to be performed on receipt of advance payments.). 
27 Reg. § 1.461-l(a)(2). · 
28 ld. 
29 See infra text accompanying notes 32-39. Sec also Aidinoff and Lopala, Section 
461 and Accrual Method Taxpayers: The Treatment of Liabilities Arising from 
Obligations to be Performed in the Future, 33 Tax Lawyer 789 {1980). 
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interest. Assume also that T is in the 50 percent tax bracket and is on the 
accrual method. 
T would be entitled to a current deduction of $10,000. That deduction 
would result in a tax benefit of $5,000 for the year the liability arose. 
Interest deductions in the aggregate amount of $10.000 would be allowed 
over the five year term of the loan. 
Example 2: Assume the same facts as in Example I, except T agrees to pay 
S $20,000 in year 5 (the present value of which is $1 0,000), rather than borrow 
the $10,000 from a bank. Under the view that expenses to be paid in the future 
are deductible by an accrual method taxpayer at their face amount, T 
would be entitled to a current deduction of $20,000. That deduction would 
result in a current tax benefit to T of $10,000. 
Arguably, a deduction could be disallowed to T if the transaction 
described in Example 2 constituted a "plan deferring the receipt of compen-
sation" within the meaning of section 404. 30 
Example 3: Assume the same facts as in Example 2, except S was not a 
lawyer but rather an individual plaintiff who sued T for personal injury 
damages resulting from T's business activity. The tax consequences to T of this 
"structured settlement" under the face amount deduction rule would be the 
same as suggested in Example 2-a current deduction of $20,000. 
The application of the face amount deduction rule to Examples 2 and 3 
suggest a troublesome question. Could a 50% taxpayer get a $10,000 tax 
benefit which he could invest to fund the entire, or at least a large portion of, 
the $20,000 liability? If so, the Government would pay much of the cost of the 
services or liability, as the case may be. 31 
Example 3 provides a nuance to this troublesome question. If T's liability to 
Sis for personal injury, S, the plaintiff, will have no income under section 104, 
even if payments are received 5 years hence. 
'tj 831.2(3) Support for Face Amount Accrual Rule 
The apparent abuse on the deduction side, as indicated above, would 
result from acceptance of a rule that provides that if a liability for a current 
expense item meets the all events test, the full amount of the liability is 
deductible. 32 That rule has substantial case law support. For example, the 
court in Lawyer's Title Guaranty Fund v. United State 33 allowed a lawyers' 
30 See I.R.C. § 404(a)(5) and (b); Reg.§ 1.404(b)-1. 
31 See McGown, Structured Settlements: Deduct now and Pay Later, 60 Taxes 
251 (1982), who recognizes the benefits and concludes that they are available in 
structured settlement situations such as Example 3. 
32 Reg.§ 1.461-l(a)(2). See also United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422(1926), 
where the Court held that an accrual basis taxpayer-corporation must take income 
tax deductions for munitions tax in the year in which the tax is accrued and not in 
the year the munitions tax becomes due and payable. 
33 508 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1975). See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 133, 
1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (92 Stat.) 2763, 2783, which has apparently 
changed that result as it relates to services provided by independent contractors to 
be paid for in the future. See also Technical Corrections Act of 1979, Pub. L.No. 
96-222, § 101(a)(5), 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (94 Stat.) 194, 196; 
Senate Comm. on Finance, Technical Corrections Act of 1979, S.Rep.No. 498, 
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 316, 
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insurance fund on the accrual method of accounting to deduct the full amount 
of commissions for writing policies credited to individual lawyers and not 
normally payable for seven years. Moreover, the Service acquiesced and 
announced that it would follow that case. 34 
In Washington Post Co. v. United States 35 the court also allowed 
deductions for accruals where future payment was not expected for several 
years and, indeed, the time of payment was uncertam. On the income side, the 
Supreme Court, in Commissioner v. Hanson. 37 has required that automobile 
dealers accrue income in the full amount to be received even though payment 
of a portion would not be received for up to 60 months. 
The Internal Revenue Service has also ruled favorably under a fact 
pattern similar to Example 3. Revenue Ruling 69-429,38 involved an accrual 
method partnership that was required to pay a workman's compensation 
award to an injured employee for which it was liable under state law. In less 
than 150 words, which included a statement of the facts, the Service ruled that 
the full amount of the liability was deductible in the year in which the award 
was determined. 
,-r 831.2(4). Contrary Arguments 
Nevertheless, the issue is not free from doubt. In Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. 
United States, 39 the court held that if payment was too far into the future, the 
deduction with respect to the future payment obligation would be disallowed. 
In Mooney, the court disallowed a deduction to an airplane manufacturer for 
the $1,000 face amount of "Mooney Bonds" issued to airplane purchasers 
and payable to bearer on retirement of their airplanes. Retirement of an 
airplane and, therefore, payment of the bond was estimated at between 15 to 
30 years in the future. The court sustained the Commissioner's use of discretion 
under section 446(b) (clear reflection of income) because the liability to pay the 
bonds was so far into the future that (1) the relationship of the obligation of 
future payment to current income was attenuated, and (2) it could not be 
certain that the amount would ever be paid. The Mooney court took an all or 
nothing approach. Because the payment date was so far in the future, no 
deduction was allowed. Presumably, if the payment date had not been so 
distant, the court would have allowed a deduction in the full amount of the 
bonds. 
Another argument based on section 446(b) may also be available to 
disallow a portion of the deduction. The argument is based upon the 
economic substance of a deferred payment transaction. Referring again to 
Examples (2) and (3 ), it may be argued that, in substance, what really 
happened in these transactions was the following: T undertook an obligation to 
pay $20,000 in five years. The value of that obligation was approximately 
$10,000 and that was the amount of the proper accrual. The remaining 
$10,000 constituted interest on the $10,000 and accmed over the five years 
rather than in the first year. Accordingly, accrual of a deduction for the 
entire latter amount should not be permitted in the first year, but rather 
329-330. 
34 Rev. Rul. 77-266, 1977-2 C.B. 236. 
35 405 F.2d 1279 (Ct.CI. 1969). 
36 See also Lukens Steel Co. v. Comm'r, 442 F .2d 1131 (3rd Cir. 1971 ). 
37 360 U.S. 446(1959). 
38 1969-2 C.B. 108. 
39 420 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1969). 
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should be allowed only over the five years. 
The approach suggested in that argument conforms to the approach taken by 
the Accounting Principles Board in APB No. 21, unanimously adopted by the 
Board and issued in August, 1971.40 That opinion states that a note without 
stated interest exchanged for property, goods or services should not be 
reported at its face amount even if the exchange was a bargained 
transact10n entered into at arm's length. 
"In these circumstances, the note, the sales price and the cost of the 
property, goods, or service exchanged for the note should be recorded 
at the fair value of the property, goods, or service or at an amount that 
reasonably approximates the market value of the note, whichever is the 
more clearly determinable. That amount may or may not be the same 
as its face amount, and any resulting discount or premium should be 
accounted for as an element of interest over the life of the note ... "41 
Accordingly, it could be argued that the Commissioner has the authority 
under section 446(b) to require T to report the transaction for tax 
purposes in a manner that clearly reflects income as determined under 
generally accepted accounting principles. 
The issue could then come down to whether the Commissioner's authority 
under section 446(b) is sufficiently broad to overturn longstanding 
assumptions and substantial judicial authority to accomplish an 
economically logical result. No court has yet taken this position, and 
contrary judicial precedents go back more than fifty years. On the other hand, 
these precedents developed when interest rates were low relative to current 
rates and when distortions resulting from face amount accruals were small 
relative to current distortions. Moreover, when they developed, they con-
formed to the general accounting practices of the day, and those practices 
have now changed. 
Also troublesome in accepting the clear reflection of income argument is the 
enactment of section 483 to impute interest in sales transactions when no 
interest is stated. Arguably, the enactment of section 483 and its narrow scope 
indicates that Congress intended to leave face amount accruals untouched in 
the nonsales area. Moreover, since that section is primarily a character section, 
not a timing section, in that it is directed at preventing conversion of ordinary 
income into capital gains,42 its enactment perhaps indicates Congressional 
indifference to the timing problem, the precise problem raised by face amount 
accruals. 
Finally, case law prior to the enactment of section 483 generally held that 
interest could not be imputed in a sales transaction.43 The arguable implication 
of that case law is that absent a statutory requirement to the contrary, the 
parties to a deferred payment transaction are free to set a rate of interest and 
even to agree to no interest at all. On the other hand, in those cases the 
Commissioner failed to explicitly exercise authority under section 446(b ). 
There is one final troubling implication with regard to use of authority 
granted under section 446(b ). There is no universally accepted standard of 
40 APB Opinion No. 21 (August, 1971). 
41 APB Opinion No. 21 at U 12. 
42 See H.R. Rep. No. 749, 88th Gong., 1st Sess. (1963), 1964-1 G.B. (part 2) 125, 
196-198, 332-336; S. Rep. No. 830, 88th Gong. 2d Sess. (1964). 1964-1 G.B. (part 
2) SOS, 605-608. 
43 See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. 
140 
Interest Elements in Tax Planning 
clear reflection of income against which to evaluate the taxpayer's method. It 
is generally recognized that tax accmal accounting diverges from financial 
accmal accounting. The section 446(h) economic substance argument implies 
that the accrual method of tax accounting may not clearly reflect income. 
That argument has generally been reserved for the cash method, but it has 
been applied, at least in Technical Advice memoranda, to accmal method 
taxpayers. 44 If the accrual method of tax accounting is not the standard 
against which to measure clear reflection of income, and the cash method 
certainly is not, then the standard of clear reflection referred to in 446(b) is an 
income reporting standard that is not set forth in the Code. On the other hand, 
if generally accepted accounting principles, as modified by certain specific 
Code sections, represent the standard against which clear reflection is 
measured, that problem disappears. And, GAAP is the standard currently being 
applied by the Service in determining whether the cash method clearly 
reflects income in accounting method change request situations.45 
~ 832. The parties to a loan agreement can determine how interest 
on the loan is to be earned. 
~ 832.1. Statutory Rules. 
The Internal Revenue Code in section 163 deals with the deductibility of 
interest payments. The Code, in section 461 (g), deals with the timing of 
those deductions. Section 461 (g), enacted under the Tax Reform Act of 
1976,46 in general, disallows as an interest deduction interest paid by a cash 
method borrower that is properly allocable to another period. The section 
provides as follows: 
"(g) Prepaid Interest.-
(!) In generaL-If the taxable income of the taxpayer is computed under the 
cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting, interest paid by the 
taxpayer which, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, is properly 
allocable to any period-
(A) with respect to which the interest represents a charge for the 
use or forbearance of money, and 
(B) which is after the close of the taxable year in which paid, 
shall be charged to capital account and shall be treated as paid in the period 
to which so allocable."4 
The section, however, does not set forth a rule for determining the cost of 
money for each period; it is silent on the question of how much of the 
interest paid is chargeable to the current period and how much to a future 
44 But see L TR"s 8017008 and 8017009 (Dec. 31, 1979). 
45 Speech to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants on May 17, 
1983, in Washington, D.C. 
46 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-455, 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (90 
Slat.) 1520 (effective October4, 1976). 
47 Subparagraph 2 of section 461 (g) provides as follows: 
"EXCEPTION.-This subsection shall not apply to points paid in respect of any 
indebtedness incurred in connection with the purchase or improvement of, and 
secured by, the principal residence of the taxpayer to the extent that, under 
regulations prescribed by the Secretary, such payment of points is an established 
business practice in the area in which such indebtedness is incurred, and the 
amount of such payment does not exceed the amount generally charged in such 
area." 
141 
Tax Planning for the Individual 
period. Further, there are presently no regulations under section 461 (g) 
clarifying those matters. 
The Code, as a result of TEFRA, does prov1dc some guidance on this 
question, hut in another context. Section 1232A provides for a method of 
determining how interest is earned on an obligation sold with original issue 
discount. In general, original issue discount arises when a debt obligation is 
sold by the issuer at a price ("issue price") less than the price at which the 
issuer will redeem the obligation at the end of 1ts tem1 ("redemption price"). The 
difference between the redemption price and the issue price is called original 
issue discount (OlD). OlD is considered earned by the holder over the life of 
the obligation, regardless of whether the holder is on the cash or accmal method. 
Prior to TEFRA, OlD was considered earned under section 1232 on a straight 
line basis-in equal amounts each month. 
Section 1232A, dealing with original issue discount, and section 1232B, 
dealing with stripped coupon bonds, were enacted under TEFRA to change 
that result. Under those sections, OID is considered earned at a uniform 
rate of compound interest throughout the term of the obligation. In other 
words, a uniform rate of interest is determined by looking to the issue price, 
redemption price and term of an obligation issued with original issue 
discount. In the first year, the amount of original issue discount attributed to 
that year is computed by applying a constant interest rate (the "yield to 
maturity" determined on the basis of compounding at the close of each 
bond period) to the issue price. For subsequent periods, the issue price is 
adjusted upward by adding previously included original issue discount and the 
yield to maturity is applied to that amount (the "adjusted issue price"). Thus, 
under this method, more interest will be considered earned in the latter 
years of the obligation than in the earlier years. Thus, TEFRA substituted 
economic accuracy for mechanical simplicity. 
~ 832.2. Nonstatutory Rules Prior to Revenue Ruling 83-84. 
In contrast to the newly-enacted statute, the case law so far has failed to 
provide precise guidance on how interest is earned. For example, in James 
Brothers Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 48 the court said "in the absence of proof of 
any contrary arrangement between the lender and borrower ... , the interest 
in respect of the borrower's single promissory note is deemed to accrue 
ratably over the entire period of said note." 4Y Further, in Gunderson Bros. 
Engineering Corp. v. Commissioner, 5° the court held that a finance charge on a 
note received in a dealer installment sale was earned ratably over the term of 
the note. In that case, the taxpayer used the Sum of the Years Digits method 
which the court held clearly reflected income. But the court specifically did 
not pass on the propriety of the taxpayer's method since it was not contested 
by the Service. 51 The Service, rather, had sought to include the full amount of 
the finance charge in income at the time of the sale. 
The Service also had failed to provide guidance prior to Revenue Ruling 83-
84. For example, in Revenue Ruling 72-10052, the Service recognized the Rule of 
78's method of computing interest on installment loans as an acceptable 
method in the context of short term loans. In the situations dealt with in that 
48 41 T.C. 917 (1964). 
49 ld. at 920-21. 
50 42 T.C. 419 (1964), acq., 1967-2 C.B. 2. 
51 ld. at 427. 
52 1972-1 C.B. 122 
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ruling, the respective loans were for 12 and 60 months. Further, Revenue Ruling 
74-607"3, in "clarifying" that mling, erroneously viewed the Rule of 78's as a 
method of applying the effective r::1te of interest to the unpaid b::1lance of ::1 
lo::1n. Revenue Ruling 79-22854 reiterated the Service's acceptance of the Rule of 
78's in the context dealt with in Revenue Ruling 72-100, as "clarified" by 
Revenue Kuling 74-607. Finally, in Revenue Kuling 74-395 55 , the Serv1ce 
ll1dicated that prepaid interest could be recovered through deductions over 
the life of ::1 loan under the Rule of 78's, if that method was provided for in 
the loan instrument. 
The courts and the Service have held, however, that payments of interest at 
the inception of a loan in the form of points or otherwise are not 
deductible when paid. For example, in Sandor v. Commissioner, 56 the court held 
that prepayment of five years' interest was not deductible under section 446(b) 
because a deduction would distort the taxpayer's income. And in Revenue 
Ruling 74-607, the Service held that commitment fees or points paid at the 
inception of the loan are not deductible when paid, but rather are deductible 
ratably over the life of the loan. 
~ 832.2(1). Tax Planning Techniques: 
The absence of a clearly-stated nonstatutory normative principle articulating 
how interest is earned has resulted in a perceived vacuum. Into that perceived 
vacuum have jumped the tax planners. 
An important introductory comment is in order at this point. The plans to 
be discussed in this section of the article are popular tax shelter 
techniques. They are grounded on proposition 2. Though somewhat different in 
form, they share a common objective. They are designed to accelerate or "front 
load" interest deductions for accrual method debtors on loans that provide for 
interest payments on a different schedule than interest accruals. 
~ 832.2(2). Rule of 78's. 
The Rule of 78's is a method of allocating the total amount of interest 
earned during the term of the loan among the periods of the loan. It 
operates in a manner similar to the Sum of Years Digits method for 
computing depreciation. Under the Rule of 78's method, the amount of 
interest allocable to each taxable period is determined by multiplying the 
total interest payable over the life of the indebtedness by a fraction (a) the 
numerator of which is the number of taxable periods remaining on such 
indebtedness at the time the calculation is made and (b) the denominator of 
which is the sum of the periods' digits for the term of the indebtedness. 
An illustration will be helpful in explaining how this method works. 
Assume a five-year loan of $100 with aggregate interest earned over the five 
years of SIOO. Under a generalized Rule of 78's method, the amount of 
interest allocated to year 1 would be computed as follows: 
5 
1+2+3+4+5 
53 1974-2 C.B. 149 
54 1979-2 C.B. 200 
55 1974-2 C.B. 46 
X $100 = 
5 
15 X $100 = 33 1/3 
56 62 T.C. 469 {1974), a/Td 536 F.2d 874 {9th Cir. 1976). 
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In fact, the Rule of 78's derives its name from the sum of the months' digits 
from 1 through 12, which equals 78. 
The Rule of 78's computation results in a greater proportion of interest 
allocated to the early periods of the loan than would otherwise be required hy 
application of a uniform interest rate throughout the term of the loan. the 
me event of payment prior to the due date of the loan results in a penalty in 
that the borrower's cost of the loan exceeds the pro-rata interest amount 
computed by apphcation of the uniform rate of interest throughout the term of 
the loan. A Rule of 78's computation is a common provision in short-term 
consumer finance loans and helps assure lenders that loans will run to tern1 
because of the detriment to borrowers of early payment. 
Enter the tax shelter promoters. If the Rule of 78's method is used to 
compute interest earned on a long-term loan at the current, relatively high, 
prevailing interest rates, seemingly wonderful things happen. If an accrual 
method borrower, generally a partnership in tax shelter situations, deducts as 
interest accrued that portion of interest allocated to the early years of the loan 
under the Rule of 78's, the resulting interest deduction will greatly exceed 
the interest that would be considered earned under a uniform rate of compound 
interest. 
For example, assume a loan in the amount of$100,000 bearing interest at the 
rate of 12 percent per annum and payable in thirty equal annual installments 
of approximately $12,414 each. 
Economic interest in the first year would be $12,000 (12% of $100,000). 
Therefore, under the normal method for amortizing a loan with level 
payments, a portion of the first year's payment would satisfy the accrued 
interest and the remaining portion would amortize the principal. Each year the 
interest component of the payment would decrease as the outstanding principal 
balance of the loan was reduced, and there would be a corresponding increase 
in the principal portion. Homeowners with mortgages will be familiar with this 
amortization method, since this is the typical amortization method for those 
loans. 
Interest computed under the Rule of 78's method for the first year, 
however, would be approximately S 17,575, an amount greater than the 
economic interest and, in fact, greater than the entire first year's payment. 
~832.2(3). Step or Variable Interest. 
A related and similar example involves variable rates of interest that 
descend during the term of the loan. Assume again the $100,000, 30 year self-
amortizing loan of equal payments of $12,414. Assume, though, that instead 
of a fixed 12 percent rate of interest, the loan provides for interest computed as 
follows: 17.575 percent per annum for the first year, 17 percent for the next 
year, etc. Under that formula, variable rate interest in year 1 would be 
$17,575 as compared with economic interest of $12,000. 
~832.2(4). Analysis 
These two examples raise several interesting tax accounting issues. When 
does interest accrue? Has $17,575 of interest accrued in year 1, since the 
agreement provides that amount is earned, or has only $12,000 accrued? 
That depends in part on two subsidiary questions relating to the accrual tax 
accounting rules discussed previously. First, have all events occurred after the 
first year to fix liability for interest at $17,575? That amount, after all, will 
have to be paid even if the loan is discharged prior to maturity. Is that 
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enough to satisfy the test or is the excess of $17,575 over SI2,000 (55 ,57 5) an 
amount that is due only upon discharge of the loan, the liability for which 
awaits a further event-payment of the entire debt either prior to. or at, 
maturity? 
Second, even if the full $17,575 amount labelled interest did satisfy the "all 
events test," would the entire amount be deductible as interest in the first 
year or does a portion of it relate to subsequent years? If a portion did relate to 
subsequent years, that portion would be deductible only in those subsequent 
years. Further, in that latter connection, can interest computed in these 
examples be distinguished from "discounted" points for which no current 
interest deduction is allowed? 
The answers to the foregoing questions depend upon how we consider 
interest to be earned. Can the parties' agreement on "how interest is earned" fix 
the tax consequences, or is there an economic principle that determines how 
interest is earned? Section 1232A now prescribes a method by which interest is 
earned on an obligation issued with original issue discount. That section, in 
substance, provides that interest on such obligations is earned at a uniform rate 
of compound interest over the entire term of the obligation. Perhaps that 
normative standard, which generally conforms to economic reality, should 
be carried over to all debts, whether or not covered by section 1232A. If 
that normative rule were adopted, then accrued but unpaid interest in excess 
of the amount that economically accrues would not be deductible to an accrual 
method borrower. If the loan is paid prior to maturity, the amount of accrued 
but unearned interest, applying the Section 1232A standard of earned interest, 
may be regarded as a prepayment penalty. 
~832.2(5). Revenue Ruling 83-84 
The Service has recently answered some of these questions in Revenue 
Ruling 83-8457 • The facts of that ruling involved a loan agreement which 
provided that interest was to be earned in accordance with the Rule of 78's 
computation and the taxpayer in that situation, who was on the accrual 
method, computed his interest deduction in accordance with that computation. 
The Service held that the Rule of 78's agreement did not define how interest 
actually was earned on the loan. Rather, it represented a purely mechanical 
formula for allocating interest among periods. 
"The amount of interest attributed to the use of money for a period 
between payments is determined by applying the "effective rate of 
interest" on the loan to the " unpaid balance" of the loan for that 
period."58 
The effective rate of interest is a uniform rate over the term of the loan 
computed by reference to the amount borrowed and the repayment schedule. 
The effective rate of interest, when applied to the unpaid balance of the 
indebtedness for any period, produces the true cost of the indebtedness for 
that period, and that cost is referred to as the "economic accrual of interest" 
for that period. Accordingly, the Service held that only the amount of 
interest that economically accrues, computed by applying the effective rate of 
interest to the unpaid balance, will be deductible and no deduction for interest 
will be allowed for any year in excess of that amount. 
57 Rev. Rul. 83-84, 1983-23 I.R.B. 12, modifies and supersedes Rev. Rul. 72-100, 
1972-1 C.B. 122. 
58 1983-23 I.R.B. at 13. 
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Although the facts of Revenue Ruling 83-84 involve the Rule of 78's, the 
analysis and implications of the ruling are far broader. The mling itself 
suggests that it will be extended. Tt provides as follows: 
"Because interest is earned by application of the effective rate of 
interest over the term of the loan, any agreement that provides that 
interest is earned in another manner, such as under the Rule of 78's 
computation, lacks econom1c substance because it tails to rctlcct the 
fb . 59 tme cost o orrowmg. 
The Service did permit a limited carve-out from the general rule enunciated 
in Revenue Ruling 83-84 for certain short term consumer loans which provided 
for interest in accordance with the Rule of 78's. Revenue Procedure 83-4060 
provided this exception but limited its application to situations when "there is a 
self amortizing loan that requires level payments, at regular intervals at least 
annually, over a period not in excess of 5 years (with no balloon payment at 
the end ofthe loan term) ... " 
Thus, the Service has taken a large step in supplying a normative 
standard for determining how interest is earned on a loan. Because the 
mling, on its face, deals with a Rule of 78's fact pattern, practitioner's have 
questioned its scope and implications. Proceedurally, they have requested 
guidance on the application of section 481 relating to the adjustments 
required for a taxpayer who is changing from an erroneous method of 
accounting such as the accounting for interest under the Rule of 78's 
method to a correct method. The Service is aware of the need for guidance on 
this matter. 
Substantively, practitioners have questioned the application of the mling to 
other methods of computing interest. For example, will a borrower who enters 
into a loan transaction that provides that interest will accrue at 9 percent 
simple, but will not be due until the end of the loan term, be permitted to 
deduct each year the stated interest or only the amount that economically 
accrues? The broad analysis of Revenue Ruling 83-84 suggests the latter. 
Are there situations, however, in which a variable interest rate would be 
justified from an economic point of view? Perhaps a variable rate is only 
justified if the rate is tied to an independent variable such as the prime rate of 
interest. 
The questions suggested in this part and the Service's response need to be 
considered in connection with planning around proposition 2 or in evaluating 
others' plans. 
~833. The parties to a loan arrangement have been free to allocate 
payments between interest and principal even if the interest has not yet 
been ea rued. 
,i833.1. Present Law. 
Allocation of payments on a loan can have important tax consequences to 
both the borrower and the lender. Payments of interest, in general, are 
deductible by the borrower if they relate to the current year, and are 
includible in the lender's income regardless of the year to which they 
relate. 61 Payments of principal, on the other hand, are not deductible by the 
borrower nor includible in the lender's income. Rather, they are regarded as a 
59 1983-23 I.R.B. at 14. 
60 Rev. Proc. 83-40, 1983-23 I.R.B. 22. 
61 See supra text accompanying notes 6-11. 
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return of capital from borrower to lender. Thus, even if the absolute 
amount and schedule of repayments are fixed, the labelling of those repayments 
may be quite important for tax purposes. 
In general, the case law has heen quite liberal in allowing taxpayers to 
allocate repayment of a loan between interest and principal. For example, in 
Huntington-Redondo Cu. v. Commissioner, 62 the court held that the 
parties to a loan agreement have the nght to agree to an allocat10n of 
payments between interest and pnnctpal and that any such allocation will be 
detenninative for income tax purposes. 63 More specifically, in E. P. Greenwood 
v. Commissioner, 64 the court held that the parties can agree to have all payments 
allocated first to interest, and in O'Dell v. Commissioner, 65 the court held that 
the parties can agree to have all payments allocated first to principal. 
The Internal Revenue Service has been quite liberal in this regard also. 
The Service held in Revenue Ruling 63-57,66 for example, that if parties to a Joan 
agree that payments on a note will be charged to principal and only after 
principal is repaid to interest, the lender will have no income until receipt of 
payments designated interest under the repayment agreement. Further, in 
Revenue Ruling 70-647,67 the Service held that the parties' agreement to the 
designation of a payment to principal may be inferred from the circumstances of 
the loan. 
Moreover, it appears that payments can be allocated to interest even if the 
interest has not yet been earned on the loan. Points paid in advance for the use 
of money are a prime example of this phenomenon. Several recent cases, such 
as, Sandor v. Commissioner, 68 and Burck v. Commissioner, 6~ave treated 
points as interest, albeit prepaid interest. In fact, points paid for the use of 
money are now recognized as interest statutorily as a result of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1976. Section 461 (g) recognizes that "points" not paid for services 
may be treated as interest and, indeed, subsection (g)(2) permits a current 
deduction for points treated as prepaid interest under certain circumstances if 
connected with a mortgage on the payer's personal residence. 
~ 833.2. Tax Planning Techniques. 
From a tax planning point of view, advantageous labelling of payments as 
interest or principal could, based upon present statements of the la\v, yield 
tax benefits to the borrower or the lender. Because the parties to a loan 
agreement may employ different methods of accounting, tax advantages to 
one may not be offset by tax detriment to the other. In other words, there 
may be no diversity of interest in labelling payments, and the lender and the 
borrower could reach an agreement detrimental to the third, umcprescnted, 
party in the agreement-the Govemment. 
A series of examples will be helpful to illustrate how one set of tax 
planning objectives can be accomplished: deferral of income to the lender 
and maximization of deduction for the borrower. Assume that L lends 
$100,000 to B. Assume the loan bears interest at 10 percent per annum, 
62 36 B.T.A. 116 {1937), acq., 1937-2 C.B. 14. 
63 See also Sefton v. Comm'r, 292 F.2d 399 (9th Cir. 1961). 
64 34 B.T.A. 1209 {1936), acq., 1937-1 C.B. 11. 
65 26 T.C. 592 {1956), acq., 1963-1 C.B. 4. 
66 1963-1 C.B. 103. 
67 1970-2 C.B. 38. 
68 62 T.C. 469 {1974), afTd, 536 F.2d 874 {9th Cir. 1976). 
69 533 F.2d 768 {2nd Cir. 1976). 
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compounded annually, and is to be fully amortized by level annual payments 
of$15,000. Assume further that Band L are unrelated within the meaning of 
Section 267(b). Set forth arc two examples, containing changes to certain 
variables, but without change to the economics of the transaction. The 
variables are (1) the allocation of payments between interest and principal, 
and (2) the methods of accounting employed by B and L. 
Assume, as the first variatwn, that the parties agree to allocate the entire 
$15,000 annual payment to interest. Under the case law and Service 
positions set forth above, it appears that L will have $15,000 includible in 
income, regardless of whether he is on the cash or accrual method of 
accounting. B, however, will be entitled to a deduction of $10,000, the 
amount of interest chargeable to the first year of the loan. This will be true 
regardless of his method of accounting. The remaining $5,000 of the 
payment will constitute prepaid interest, nondeductible in the year of 
payment but deductible in subsequent years. 
Suppose, however, that the parties had agreed to allocate the entire 
$15,000 to repayment of principal. If such an allocation were respected for 
tax purposes, the tax consequences to L and B would appear to be as 
follows: IfL were on the cash method, he would have no income because he has 
merely recovered his capital; the income element of the loan has yet to be 
received and a cash method taxpayer has income upon receipt. IfL were on the 
accrual method, however, he would have $10,000 of income because $10,000 of 
interest (10% of $100,000) accrued on the loan and an accrual method 
taxpayer, in general, realizes income when it is earned, even if it is not 
received until a later period. 
B's tax consequences are also dependent upon his method of accounting. If 
he is on the cash method, payment of $15,000 allocated entirely to 
principal would yield no interest deduction to him. A cash method taxpayer 
cannot deduct interest on a loan until he pays that interest. If he were on the 
accrual method, however, there is general case law support for the conclusion 
that he could be entitled to a deduction of $10,000. 70 Because payment of an 
item is generally irrelevant for deduction purposes to an accrual method 
taxpayer, the allocation of the entire annual payment to principal does not 
cause B any tax detriment. 
The variations on the example suggest a rule of thumb for allocating loan 
repayments. If allocations are respected for tax law purposes, it appears that 
loans between cash method lenders and accrual method borrowers should 
provide for allocation of payments first to principal and, only after the 
principal of the loan has been repaid, to interest. Such an allocation would 
permit maximum income deferral to L. The economic benefit resulting to L 
preasumably could be divided between B and L through negotiation. The 
detriment of that negotiation would fall on the unrepresented party-the 
Government. 
'1!833.3. Words of Caution 
A few words of caution may be in order. The examples assumed that B and 
L were unrelated. If they were related within the meaning of section 267(b), 
for example, if B and L were husband and wife or parent and child, section 267 
would disallow the deduction to an accrual basis borrower for accrued but 
unpaid interest payable to a cash method creditor. 
70 But see Mooney Aircraft Inc. v. Comm'r, 420 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1969). 
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Second, there is a line of cases that has grown up in the context of sales of 
property for promises of future payment. When the note has arisen because 
L sold property to B and reported the transaction as a "closed transaction" 
including the fair market value of B's note as an amount realized under 
section 1001, some cases have prescribed how payments on that note should 
be treated. 71 
In general, payments recc1vcd on the purchaser's promissory note will be 
apportioned between recovery hy the taxpayer of his basis in the note, which is 
the fair market value of the note at the time of receipt, and collection gain. 
The fraction of each payment that is treated as a return of capital is equal to 
the ratio of the fair market value of the obligation at the time of sale to the 
face value of the obligation. 72 
Under some circumstances, however, there is authority to report collection 
gain on a note, the value of which is less than the face amount, only after 
basis has been fully recovered rather than pro rata. This cost recovery 
treatment has been permitted in cases in which the promissory note is 
speculative. In Underhill v. Commissioner, 73 the Tax Court listed several 
factors to be used in determining whether a particular obligation is speculative, 
including (1) the personal liability of the debtor and his financial position; 
(2) marketability of the obligation; (3) substantial default of the obligation; (4) 
the terms of payment and the existence of security for payment and value 
thereof; and (5) the size of the discount.74 
The principal line of cases that has been discussed and this latter line 
have never crossed, even though both lines deal, in essence, with the same 
issue, fixed return on invested funds-interest. 
~ 840. CONCLUSION 
This article has set forth three propositions, and has raised an important 
and fundamental issue in the tax law with each of them. First, should 
interest that is clearly part of the economics of a transaction be ignored for tax 
purposes? In that connection, should an accrual method taxpayer be able to 
deduct the face amount of an obligation of future payment when it arises? 
Second, how is the annual cost of money computed- as the parties agree or in 
some standardized economic way? Third, should the parties' agreement on the 
allocation of payments between interest and principal, when there is no 
diversity of interest between debtor and creditor, be effective for tax 
purposes? 
All of these questions share a common element-have a common thread: 
they involve in some form the question whether parties without diversity of 
interest should have carte blanche to agree on how interest that is part of 
71 Under amended section 453 dealing with installment sales, closed transaction 
treatment requires that the seller elect out or installment sales treatment. 
72 See, e.g., Darby Investment Corp. v Comm'r, 37 T.C. 839 (1962), afrd, 315 F.2d 
551, 553 (6th Cir. 1963); Tombari v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 889,892-93 (9th Cir. 
1962). See generally Goldberg, Open Transaction Treatment for Deferred Payment 
Sales After the Installment Sales Act of 1980, 34 Tax Lawyer 605 (1981 ). 
73 45 T.C. 489, 494 (1966). 
74 See also Liftin v. Comm'r, 36 T.C. 909,911 (1961), a/Td, 317 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 
1963). 
149 
Tax Planning for the Individual 
the economics of a transaction will be treated for tax purposes to the 
detriment of the third, unrepresented party-the Government. When the tax 
consequences of a transaction diverge from the economic consequences, 
there is the likelihood of abuse. The inadequacy in the law so far has been its 
inability or unwillingness to properly deal with the time value of money. 
Tax planners have mixed and matched these propositions and have used 
them in combinations to achieve tax results too good to be true. Perhaps 
they are too good to be tme. 
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